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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Cognitive  architectures  (e.g., ACT-R)  have  not  traditionally  been  used  to understand  intuitive  decision-
making;  instead,  models  tend  to be designed  with  the  intuitions  of their  modelers  already  hardcoded
in  the  decision  process.  This  is  due  in  part  to  a fuzzy  boundary  between  automatic  and  deliberative
processes within  the architecture.  We  argue  that  instance-based  learning  satisﬁes  the  conditions  for
intuitive  decision-making  described  in  Kahneman  and  Klein  (2009), separates  automatic  from  delibera-
tive processes,  and  provides  a general  mechanism  for the  study  of  intuitive  decision-making.  To  better
understand  the  role  of the  environment  in decision-making,  we describe  biases  as  arising  from  threeecision-making
euristics
sources:  the  mechanisms  and  limitations  of  the  human  cognitive  architecture,  the  information  structure
in the  task  environment,  and  the  use  of  heuristics  and  strategies  to adapt  performance  to  the  dual  con-
straints  of cognition  and environment.  A uniﬁed  decision-making  model  performing  multiple  complex
reasoning  tasks  is described  according  to this  framework.
©  2014  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier Inc.  This is an
open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/This article describes how computational models of intuitive
ecision-making are expressed within the constraints of the ACT-
 cognitive architecture (Anderson et al., 2004). These models are
oteworthy for their ability to explain a variety of heuristics and
iases in terms of the processes and representations that produce
hem. These phenomena have largely been captured and deﬁned
s results of experimental manipulations (Kahneman & Tversky,
996) but not in terms of process models justiﬁed by a cognitive
rchitecture (Dimov, Marewski, & Schooler, 2013). A concern of
odeling intuitive decision-making behavior using cognitive archi-
ectures is confounded by the explicit decisions encoded by the
odelers. This criticism can be described as: instead of model-
ng intuitive behavior per se, cognitive models make explicit the
ntuitions of their designers (Cooper, 2007; Lewandowsky, 1993;
chultheis, 2009; Cooper, 2007; Lewandowsky, 1993; Schultheis,
009; Shallice & Cooper, 2011). We  address this criticism by
howing that the instance-based learning mechanisms in the
CT-R cognitive architecture (Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003)
xhibit the characteristics of intuitive decision-making as described
n Kahneman and Klein, (2009), and provide a clearer distinc-
ion between automatic and implicit (System 1) processes and
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deliberative and explicit (System 2) processes. In addition, we
speciﬁcally address this modeler selection criticism by showing that
the explicit strategies of the models instantiate the theories of the
model designer and thus are a mechanism for theory evaluation
rather than a confounding factor in model development.
In making this argument, we recommend adopting a tripartite
explanation of decision-making and biases that illustrates the crit-
ical role of the task environment in the decision-making process.
We argue that decision-making should be understood in terms of:
(1) the mechanisms and limitations of the architecture; (2) the
information structure in the task environment; and (3) the use
of heuristics and strategies to adapt performance to the dual con-
straints of cognition and environment. From examples of existing
models, we show that simulating behavior within a cognitive archi-
tecture is a useful methodology for the study of the mechanisms,
variables, and time-course in complex decision-making processes
that are impossible in experimentation due to exploding combina-
torics.
1. What is intuitive decision-making?Simon (1992) characterized intuitive decision-making skill as
“nothing more and nothing less than recognition” (p. 155). In
their seminal work on expertise, Chase and Simon (1973) iden-
tiﬁed that chess experts require upwards of a decade of study



















































mR. Thomson et al. / Journal of Applied Resea
o retain 50,000–100,000 distinct and rapidly accessible patterns
f chess positions. Intuitive decision-making has been studied in
oth the naturalistic decision-making and heuristics and biases lit-
rature, with the former generally focused on the successes of
ntuitive reasoning, while the latter generally focused on its fail-
res (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). A distinguishing feature of intuitive
ecision-making is that a single plausible solution rapidly ‘comes
o mind’ in its entirety without explicit or conscious awareness of
he causal factors entering into the decision (i.e., not being con-
ciously derived in a piecemeal, step-by-step, or in a ‘deliberative’
anner; Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1995). As such, intuitive
easoning is considered System 1. For example, Klein, Calderwood,
nd Clinton-Cirocco (1986) found that ﬁre marshals tended to make
apid decisions by generating a single alternative, mentally simu-
ating its outcome, and either making minor revisions or adopting
he next closest alternative. Effectively, ﬁre marshals were pattern-
atching based on their prior experiences. This strategy has been
ermed recognition-primed decision-making.
Conversely, deliberative decision-making is often characterized
s strategic, effortful, slow, and rule-oriented (Klein, 1998), and as
uch is considered System 2 thinking (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005;
tanovich & West, 1999). Interestingly, the act of verifying an intu-
tion is generally seen as optional, effortful, and thus a function of
ystem 2 (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).
In order to gain intuitive expertise, two conditions ﬁrst need be
et. The ﬁrst condition is that people receive extensive practice in
 task environment that is sufﬁciently stable and provides causal
r statistical cues/structures that may  at least theoretically be
perationalized (Hogarth, 2001; Hogarth, 2001; Brunswik, 1957).
his need not be deterministic (e.g., playing poker is a proba-
ilistic but stable environment; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). The
econd condition is that there must be sufﬁcient feedback from
he task environment which provides people an opportunity to
earn the relevant cues/structures. In other words, feedback must
e sufﬁcient to generate a relevant internal problem space. This
equirement of feedback and interaction with the task environment
rove our adoption of the tripartite level of description.
. Why  use a cognitive architecture?
Cognitive architectures model behavior using a set of com-
on  mechanisms and processes (i.e., the architecture) whose goal
s to not only explain human behavior, but the underlying struc-
ures and representations subsuming cognition as a whole. These
echanisms should be both psychologically and neurally plausi-
le to account for human behavior. This level of description is not
enerally captured by either mathematical or informal models of
ecision-making. Before getting into further details of mechanisms,
odels, and results; there is an important argument to be made for
he role of cognitive architectures in general, which is best charac-
erized by Herbert Simon (in 1971, no less):
The programmability of the theories is the guarantor of their
operationality, an iron-clad insurance against admitting magical
entities into the head. A computer program containing magical
instructions does not run, but it is asserted of these information-
processing theories of thinking that they can be programmed
and will run. They may  be empirically correct theories about
the nature of human thought processes or empirically invalid
theories; [but] they are not magical theories. (p. 148)
In modern terms, simulations using a cognitive architecture
rovide a falsiﬁable methodology for the study of cognitive pro-
esses and representations, a particularly important characteristic
hen studying largely implicit processes such as intuitive decision-
aking. They serve several theoretical functions including: Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 180–190 181
organizing and relating a substantial number of cognitive mech-
anisms, making testable predictions, and explaining the cognitive
processes underlying human performance. In many cases, cognitive
models can perform tasks too complex to analyze with traditional
experimentation due to the combinatorics of the possible decision
space. As will be described, a single ACT-R model has explained
anchoring and adjustment, conﬁrmation, and probability match-
ing biases across a range of complex geospatial intelligence tasks
using a common instance-based learning approach (Lebiere et al.,
2013). Similarly, Marewski and Mehlhorn (2011) were able to spec-
ify 39 process models studied in decision-making using a smaller
subset of 5 ACT-R models. In short, cognitive architectures allow for
theories to be constrained by scientiﬁcally established mechanisms
and (hopefully) easily describable processes.
This is not to argue that cognitive architectures are a panacea
for studying decision-making (or psychology in general), but we
do claim that they are a valuable tool in the generation and explo-
ration of theories (c.f., models) which may  be too complex for
traditional piecemeal experimental methods. In particular, intu-
itive decision-making tends to be cognitively ‘opaque’ with little
observable evidence, and what little evidence there is coming from
highly fallible introspection. As such, many descriptions of intuitive
decision-making are inherently qualitative or are characterized
using relatively simple experimental results (Dimov et al., 2013).
An advantage of cognitive architectures is not only their ability
to objectively explain accuracy and response times in terms of
the operation of both symbolic elements and their sub-symbolic
activation strengths (and in the case of ACT-R, links to neural struc-
ture), but also the ability to go ‘under the hood’ and actually look
inside the model to explicitly examine causal processes. Such com-
putational cognitive models make testable predictions of what is
going on inside the mind of someone performing intuitive decision-
making.
One measure for validating inside the mind predictions is to per-
form model tracing. Model tracing is a technique where a model
is forced to respond with some or all of the same values as a
human participant, and then the internal states of the model are
examined to determine the inﬂuence of these ‘forced’ decisions. By
examining the commonalities between the model’s internal states
and human behavior, modelers are potentially able to make causal
claims about the nature of mental processes within participants;
that is, to explain how human performance is produced by vari-
ous cognitive mechanisms and their interaction. This performance
includes traditional measures such as accuracy and response time,
but also predictions of fMRI bold response for speciﬁc brain areas
associated with the functional modules of the cognitive architec-
ture (Anderson, 2007).
The beneﬁts of cognitive architectures can be seen as bridging
or synthesizing formal mathematical theories (such as Bayesian
modeling) and knowledge-level strategies (e.g., heuristics). As such,
cognitive architectures act as a link between Marr’s (1982) compu-
tational and algorithmic levels, with the beneﬁts of a corresponding
bridge to the physical level (i.e., neural) implementation. Bayesian
models belong to a broad class of abstract models that formally
(i.e., mathematically) explain human behavior in terms of processes
computing probabilities over a set of possible decisions. While
Bayesian (and related probabilistic) models do provide an expla-
nation of behavior, it is not generally accepted to be a cognitively
(i.e., psychologically) plausible one as the underlying mechanisms
driving the processes are somewhat vague or not tractable (Bowers
& Davis, 2012). As such, Bayesian theories belong at the computa-
tional level of Marr’s hierarchy. This is not a criticism speciﬁc to
Bayesian models, but can also be applied to other mathematical the-
ories such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), decision
theory (Berger, 1985), and quantum probability theory (Busemeyer,
Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011). Similarly, explanations in the
































































are retrieved from long-term declarative memory by an activa-
tion process. Each chunk has a base-level activation that reﬂects
its recency and frequency of occurrence. Activation spreads from
the current focus of attention through associations among chunks
Fig. 2. An example of a chunk in ACT-R. The name of the chunk is Red-Player, it is of82 R. Thomson et al. / Journal of Applied Resea
orm of heuristics (i.e., knowledge-level explanations) tend to be
ague as to the underlying processes leading to the biased behav-
or. To give another example, while fast-and-frugal heuristics (see
igerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) are explained
n terms of process models, it is contested whether the underlying
ognitive mechanisms required are psychologically plausible (e.g.,
ougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; but see Gigerenzer,
offrage, & Goldstein, 2008).
We would like to brieﬂy discuss what some consider are limita-
ions of the cognitive architecture approach, but we maintain that
hese limitations are outweighed by the advantages of this method
f theorizing. Perhaps the main criticism of cognitive architectures
s the degrees of freedom argument (e.g., Roberts and Pashler, 2000;
rifﬁths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012). This argument relies on
he notion that the numerous parameters of the architecture (and
he extensibility of the parameter space) add unnecessary complex-
ty while offering little constraint on the kinds of models that may
e generated to solve a given problem. While it is true that cognitive
rchitectures such as ACT-R are parameterized, these parameters
re well-documented, transparent in the model, and are gener-
lly dependent on each other such that it limits their capability
o over-ﬁt to the data (i.e., they have a constrained effect on data).
urthermore, this same degrees of freedom argument can and has
een applied to probabilistic models (Bowers & Davis, 2012). In
act, we argue that informal theories also fall prey to the same
egrees of freedom criticism (Grifﬁths et al., 2012), however, these
heories beneﬁt from their lack of formalization by having less obvi-
us points of criticism (i.e., no obvious parameters to point at).
ne other concern with informal theories is that they tend toward
inary oppositions (e.g., System 1 vs System 2 or explicit vs implicit
rocesses) without a clear understanding of where the boundaries
ie or how they may  be behaviorally or neurally instantiated within
he mind (see Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011 for a similar argu-
ent). In our opinion, this lack of formalization can stiﬂe progress
y leading our theorizing toward relatively arbitrary boundaries
ather than forcing theorizing to occur in a testable and predictive
nvironment.
To more directly address the degrees of freedom argument,
e argue for two techniques to mitigate its concerns: the ﬁrst
s to limit the freedom of architectural parameters through the
se of scientiﬁcally justiﬁed default values, and the second is to
evelop models which are relatively insensitive to parameter val-
es. For instance, the base-level learning (i.e., memory decay) rate
f .5 in ACT-R has been justiﬁed in over 100 published models
see the ACT-R website: http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu). In addition to
rchitectural parameters, there are ways of controlling ‘knowledge’
arameters (e.g., knowledge representation) through approaches
ike instance-based learning which use a common knowledge
epresentation determined directly by the interaction with the
xternal environment. Finally, there have been efforts to use a
ingle, more general ACT-R model to perform a series of decision-
aking tasks (e.g., Lebiere et al., 2013; Marewski & Mehlhorn,
011; Stewart, West, & Lebiere, 2009; Taatgen & Anderson, 2008,
010). Using more general models of cognition reduces the degrees
f freedom in the architecture by aligning a common set of
echanisms, parameters, and strategies into a cohesive modeling
aradigm.
In summary, descriptions at either the formal or informal level
re under-constrained. Cognitive architectures tie together both
ormal and informal levels of description (Gonzalez & Lebiere, 2013)
y combining sub-symbolic algorithms akin to formal theories with
ymbolic knowledge structures controlling those processes in a
euristic manner. As such, they provide not only explanations of
xisting behavior, but predictions of the mechanisms, knowledge,
nd behaviors of future actions based on a model’s prior experience
Thomson & Lebiere, 2013).Fig. 1. An overview of ACT-R’s default modules and their dependent buffers.
3. Why  use ACT-R?
3.1. What is ACT-R?
The following is a brief technical description of ACT-R, and
while it is helpful to understand our later arguments, readers not
interested in technical descriptions should feel free to skip this
section. For those interested in a more in-depth description of
ACT-R, please see Anderson et al. (2004) and the ACT-R website:
http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/.
ACT-R is a cognitive architecture deﬁned as a set of modules
which are integrated and coordinated through a centralized pro-
duction system (see Fig. 1). Each module is assumed to access and
deposit information into buffers associated with the module, and
the production system only responds to the contents of the buffers,
not the internal processing of the modules. The declarative memory
and production system modules, respectively, store and retrieve
information that corresponds to declarative knowledge and proce-
dural knowledge.  Declarative knowledge is the kind of knowledge
that a person can attend to, reﬂect upon, and usually articulate
in some way (e.g., by declaring it verbally or by gesture). Proce-
dural knowledge consists of the skills we display in our behavior,
generally without conscious awareness.
Declarative knowledge in ACT-R is represented formally in
terms of chunks.  The information in declarative memory cor-
responds to episodic and semantic knowledge that promotes
long-term coherence in behavior. Chunks have an explicit type,
and consist of slot-value pairs of information (see Fig. 2). Chunkstype  player,  and has three slots: name, value and mission containing values aggressive,
.8  and 2, respectively. This chunk represents the name of a hypothetical opponent
who the model assumes is aggressive with a probability of .8. In this example, the
value of .8 is derived by the model based on evidence accumulated during the task
and  is derived by the proportion of trials in which attacks occurred.
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Table  1
The list of sub-symbolic mechanisms in the ACT-R architecture.
Mechanism Equation Description
Activation Ai = Bi + Si + Pi + εi Bi: Base-level activation reﬂects the recency and frequency of use of chunk i
Si: Spreading activation reﬂects the effect that buffer contents have on the retrieval process
Pi: Partial matching reﬂects the degree to which the chunk matches the request
εi: Noise value includes both a transient and (optional) permanent component (permanent










n: The number of presentations for chunk i
tj: The time since the jth presentation
d:  A decay rate (not used by the integrated model)








k: Weight of buffers summed over are all of the buffers in the model
j: Weight of chunks which are in the slots of the chunk in buffer k
Wkj: Amount of activation from sources j in buffer k
Sji: Strength of association from sources j to chunk i
Sji = S − ln(fanji) S: The maximum associative strength (set at 4 in the model)






P: Match scale parameter (set at 2) which reﬂects the weight given to the similarity
Mki: Similarity between the value k in the retrieval speciﬁcation and the value in the
corresponding slot of chunk i
The default range is from 0 to −1 with 0 being the most similar and −1 being the largest
difference





Pi: The probability that chunk i will be recalled
Ai: Activation strength of chunk i
Aj: Activation strength of all of eligible chunks j
s: Chunk activation noise
Blended retrievals




Pi: Probability from declarative retrieval
Simij: Similarity between compromise value j and actual value i
Utility learning Ui(n) = Ui(n − 1) + ˛[Ri(n) − Ui(n − 1)] Ui(n − 1): Utility of production i after its n − 1st application
Ri (n): Reward production receives for its nth application




































First, only one production may  be executed at a time. Second, a
buffer can only contain one chunk at a time. In general, multiple
production rules can match, but only one can be active – in ACT-
R parlance ﬁred – at any point. Production utilities, learned using a
Fig. 3. An example of a production in ACT-R. The name of the production is get-j
e j Ui: Ex
Uj: is t
n declarative memory. These associations are built up from experi-
nce, and they reﬂect how chunks co-occur in cognitive processing.
hunks are compared to the desired retrieval pattern using a partial
atching mechanism that subtracts from the activation of a chunk
ts degree of mismatch to the desired pattern, additively for each
omponent of the pattern and corresponding chunk value. Noise is
dded to chunk activations to make retrieval a probabilistic process
overned by a Boltzmann (softmax) distribution.
While the most active chunk is usually retrieved, a blending pro-
ess (i.e., a blended retrieval; see Lebiere, 1999; Wallach & Lebiere,
003a) can also be applied that returns a derived output reﬂect-
ng the similarity between the values of the content of all chunks,
eighted by their retrieval probabilities reﬂecting their activations
nd partial-matching scores (see Table 1 for a list of sub-symbolic
ctivations involved in chunk retrieval and production selection).
his process enables not just the retrieval of previously encoun-
ered symbolic values but also the generation of continuous values
uch as probability judgments in a process akin to weighted inter-
olation.
Production rules are used to represent procedural knowledge in
CT-R. They specify procedures that represent and apply cognitive
kill in the current context, including how to retrieve and modify
nformation in the buffers and transfer it to other modules. In ACT-
, each production rule is a set of conditions and actions which are
nalogous to an IF-THEN rule. Conditions specify structures that are
atched in buffers, and correspond to information from the exter-
al world or other internal modules. Actions represent requests
nd modiﬁcations to the contents of the buffers, including queu-
ng perceptual-motor responses (e.g., speaking, typing, or looking
o given location). Matching production rules effectively means:
f the conditions of a given production match the current state of utility of the production determined by the utility equation above
pected utility of the competing productions j
affairs (i.e., the state of the modules and contents of the buffers)
then perform the following actions (see Fig. 3).
ACT-R uses a mix  of parallel and serial processing. Modules are
encapsulated and may  process information in parallel within one
another. However, there are two  serial bottlenecks in processing.feedback, and it tests the goal buffers (the = sign) and queries (the ? sign) the state
of  the retrieval module on the left-hand side of the equation (everything before
the  ==>). The production also modiﬁes the chunk in the goal buffer (the = sign) and
makes a request (the + sign) for a new chunk to be placed in the retrieval buffer on
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einforcement learning scheme, are used to select the single rule
hat ﬁres. As for declarative memory retrieval, production selec-
ion is a probabilistic process. Based on experience and matching
ertain criteria, two production rules may  be automatically com-
iled together into a new and more-efﬁcient rule, which accounts
or proceduralization of behavior.
.2. What does ACT-R have to do with intuitive decision-making?
Cognitive model development in ACT-R is in part derived from
he rational analysis of the task (Anderson, 1982) and information
tructures in the external environment (e.g., the design of the tasks
eing simulated), the constraints of the ACT-R architecture, and
uidelines from previous models of similar tasks (Taatgen, Lebiere,
 Anderson, 2006). A successful design pattern in specifying cogni-
ive process sequencing in ACT-R is to decompose a complex task
o the level of unit tasks. Card, Moran, and Newell (1983) suggested
hat unit tasks control immediate behavior. Unit tasks empirically
ake about 10 s. To an approximation, the structure of behavior
bove the unit task level largely reﬂects a rational structuring of
he task within the constraints of the environment, whereas the
tructure within and below the unit task level reﬂects cognitive and
iological mechanisms, in accordance with Newell’s (1990) bands
f cognition. Accordingly, in ACT-R, unit tasks are implemented by
peciﬁc goal types that control a set of productions which represent
he cognitive skills for solving those tasks.
There are a broad range of ACT-R models studying prob-
em solving, decision-making (including intuitive decision-
aking; Kennedy & Patterson, 2012), and implicit learning (see
ttp://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/publications for examples of each; also,
ee Anderson (2007) and Lebiere and Anderson (2011) for an
verview). Speciﬁc examples (all using instance-based learning)
nclude a model of how batters predict baseball pitch speed
Lebiere, Gray, Salvucci, & West, 2003), a model predicting risk aver-
ion in a repeated binary choice task (Lebiere, Gonzalez, & Martin,
007), a model of sequence learning (Lebiere & Wallach, 2001), and
 model of playing Paper Rock Scissors (West & Lebiere, 2001).
nother model of repeated binary choice also won the Technion
rediction competition over machine-learning algorithms (Stewart
t al., 2009). These models all work by storing problem-solving
nstances in declarative memory, then they make decisions by
etrieving those instances by leveraging the cognitive architecture’s
ctivation processes to extract regularities in the task environment.
There is a misconception that intuitive processes in ACT-R –
s implicit – are governed using only procedural memory pro-
esses, while deliberative processes – as explicit – are governed
y only declarative memory processes (this implicit/explicit dis-
inction has been mistakenly attributed to Wallach & Lebiere,
003b). In fact, while each declarative chunk is usually consid-
red a piece of conscious knowledge, the sub-symbolic activations
hat control the retrieval process (e.g., base-level activations and
trengths of associations) are consciously inaccessible and con-
titute the implicit knowledge of the model (Gonzalez & Lebiere,
005; Lebiere, Wallach, & Taatgen, 1998). In essence, the activation
alculus involved in retrieving a chunk is the implicit part of the
eclarative system, while the contents of the chunk itself are the
xplicit part of the declarative system.
An interesting interplay between System 1 and System 2 pro-
esses occurs during a retrieval request. When a production makes
 retrieval request it speciﬁes the type of chunk to retrieve and
otentially a set of slot-value pairs from which to match, which is
ssentially the speciﬁcation of what to retrieve. While the produc-
ion system is generally seen as an implicit (System 1) process, the
onstraints in matching the retrieval request come from explic-
tly setting which slot-value pairs to match against. Since this is
omething coded by the modeler, it could be argued that it is a Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 180–190
totally explicit strategy (i.e., System 2) based on the modelers intu-
ition (c.f., theory) of how the retrieval should function. This is a bit
of a false dichotomy because every model is a blend of both Sys-
tem 1 and System 2 processes, and the retrieval request links both
strategic (e.g., requesting a speciﬁc chunk) and implicit processes
(e.g., spreading activation). In terms of a cognitive architecture and
the no-magic doctrine (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), we  argue that
the retrieval speciﬁcation is instead best described as an implicit
heuristic (as opposed to a conscious/strategic heuristic), albeit still
being effectively the modeler’s theory of how the retrieval process
should unfold.
It is possible to make retrievals driven more by implicit pro-
cesses by using a technique that we  call ‘open’ retrievals. A retrieval
is considered open when only the type of chunk is requested and
no (or in a relaxed case, minimal) slot-value pairs are used in the
speciﬁcation of the retrieval request. An example would be when
one is given a set of indirect clues about the identity of a person
and the name of the person pops up in one’s mind from the con-
vergence of the clues rather than any speciﬁc information retrieval
process. Effectively, open retrievals are a kind of context-driven free
association. By using open retrievals, the model is relying more on
sub-symbolic activations – which are driven by experience – to
control the retrieval process. For instance, performing a retrieval
by specifying only the context and doing free association on the
outcome allows the model to match the best outcome based on the
recency and frequency of prior outcomes and spreading activation
from the current context. This stands in contrast to specifying a par-
ticular outcome in the retrieval request, which is more analogous
to the model engaging in a more strategic retrieval strategy.
A similar theme between System 1 and System 2 processes is
the nature of heuristics in decision-making. Are heuristics explicit
because of their symbolic nature, or implicit because the decision
maker is often unaware of them? The choice of which simplify-
ing heuristics are available to the model tends to be a conscious
strategy of the modeler (as opposed to being chosen by the model;
Lewandowsky, 1993). This may  be considered explicit, although
this is an uncharitable view of the modeler’s selection of heuris-
tics/strategies (e.g., the modeler’s theory of which heuristics are
available; Taatgen & Anderson, 2008). It is possible to view task
instruction as a kind of heuristic imposed by the task environ-
ment, thus by parsing the task instructions the model chooses
from a set of (generally) implicit heuristics (e.g., recognition heuris-
tic; ﬂuency heuristic; Marewski & Link, 2014) and performs the
appropriate action. Two such theories are the related notions of
cognitive niches (Marewski & Schooler, 2011) and the adaptive tool-
box (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). A cognitive niche is a simplifying
framework which describes how only a limited number of appli-
cable strategies may  be considered in a given situation based on
the interplay between available strategies, limited human capaci-
ties, and the task environment. Similarly, the adaptive toolbox is a
psychologically validated set of heuristics from which the model
may  select. Of course, these solutions still leave open to theory
the underlying basis for strategy selection of the model (Marewski,
Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010).
One of the difﬁculties in providing a more complete answer
comes from the traditional dichotomy of automatic versus deliber-
ative (or procedural versus declarative) being insufﬁcient to explain
the source of heuristics (mainly from the task environment), which
is a key indicator of whether the heuristic should be seen as pri-
marily implicit, explicit, or both.
3.3. How does instance-based learning tie into intuitive
decision-making?
Instance-based learning theory (Gonzalez et al., 2003; Taatgen
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ccumulation and recognition of experienced events or instances.
nlike instance-based machine learning algorithms (Gagliardi,
011) that are essentially strict exemplar models of categorization
pplied to big data (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998), instance-based
earning theory allows for generalization and the bootstrapping
f learning with weak methods. Weak methods are relatively
nowledge-free heuristic methods of action and exploration (such
s random choice) that are procedurally driven when there is
nsufﬁcient domain knowledge (i.e., instances) to make effective
ecisions. Once enough instances are stored, these weak methods
re supplanted by the retrieval of decisions based on these prior
nstances.
Similar to theories of intuitive expertise (Kahneman & Klein,
009), instance-based learning theory argues for the necessity of
eceiving effective feedback. Feedback is required to determine the
elative payoffs from not only expected outcomes, but from the
ctual outcome. This effectively tunes instances to real experiences
s opposed to simply existing in the cognitive realm of expecta-
ions. The combination of contextual information and the current
oal, the selected action, and the outcome of that action result in
 common condition → action → outcome representational struc-
ure. This structure reﬂects the necessary requirements for effective
earning and subsequent performance. Supporting this structure,
ebiere, Gonzalez, and Warwick (2009) have shown how Klein’s
2009) recognition-primed decision-making and instance-based
earning use similar mechanisms and make similar predictions in
he context of naturalistic decision-making. Instance-based learn-
ng, having been formulated within the principles and mechanisms
f cognition in ACT-R, makes use of the dynamics of chunk retrieval
o recall instances and also makes use of blended retrievals to
eneralize knowledge. This instance + generalization process pro-
ides an additional level of explanation and predictive power to
omplement the process speciﬁed in Klein’s analysis. As such,
ecognition-primed decision-making and other similar naturalistic
rocesses can be seen as a macrocognitive substrate that natu-
ally complements the microcognitive mechanisms of a cognitive
rchitecture (Lebiere & Best, 2009).
The main claim of instance-based learning is that implicit
nowledge is generated through the creation of instances. These
nstances are represented in chunks with slots containing the con-
itions (e.g., a set of contextual cues), the decision made (e.g.,
n action), and the outcome of the decision (e.g., the utility of
he decision). Before there is sufﬁcient task-relevant knowledge,
ecision-makers implicitly evaluate alternatives using heuristics
e.g., random choice, minimize loss, maximize gain). Once a suf-
cient number of instances are learned, decision-makers retrieve
nd generalize from these instances to evaluate alternatives, make
 decision, and execute the task. The process of feedback involves
pdating the outcome slot of the chunk according to the post
oc generated utility of the decision. Thus, when decision-makers
re confronted with similar situations while performing a task,
hey gradually abandon general heuristics in favor of improved
nstance-based decision-making processes (Gonzalez and Lebiere,
005).
Comparing instance-based learning with the necessity claims
f intuitive decision-making from Klein and Kahneman (2012),
oth consider intuitive knowledge to be learned via instances. Also,
n both cases decisions are made by pattern-matching over prior
nstances (and/or supplemented by heuristics) and then retrieving
he best ﬁt. In the case of instance-based learning, however, this
est ﬁt is computed using a generalization across the closest neigh-
ors using partial matching or blended retrievals. Both require the
ask environment to be sufﬁciently regular to be able to implic-
tly learn the statistical correlations between condition, action, and
 through either internal or external feedback – outcome. How-
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grounding implicit learning within the mechanisms of a cognitive
architecture. For instance, the dynamics of an instance’s sub-
symbolic activations (e.g., frequency and recency in the base-level
learning equation) provide a theoretically grounded mechanism
for determining which instances are likely to be retrieved for a
given situation, and also can explain why they were retrieved and
what factors came into play. This provides a much more rigor-
ous explanation of intuitive decision-making than case-studies and
introspection of experts.
IBL – as instantiated in ACT-R – also provides for a clearer dis-
tinction between automatic and deliberative processes. The act
of encoding and retrieving instances is a fully automatic process,
guided by either (hopefully open) retrieval or implicit heuristics.
However, once the retrieval is completed, what the model does
with the retrieved chunk (e.g., the structure of the subsequent pro-
ductions) is an explicit heuristic/strategy. For instance, while the
retrieved chunk might provide a recommended action, it is up to the
model (through the production system) to determine whether to
verify the action, discard the action, perform the action, or simulate
possible other outcomes.
In ACT-R, over the past 10 years models related to decision-
making and problem-solving have seen increasing use of
instance-based learning (whether explicitly referred-to as such
or otherwise; e.g., Kennedy & Patterson, 2012) to learn intu-
itive knowledge structures. This is unsurprising given that ACT-R’s
declarative memory module and chunk structure is an excellent
match for the storage and retrieval of instances, which effectively
guides people to some form of instance-based learning. In other
words, the design and constraints of the architecture lead peo-
ple to adopt an instance-based learning-like approach by using the
architecture in the most direct and intuitive way.
4. Why  a tripartite description?
An essential feature in being able to explain how a model
performs decision-making is to examine not only the sources of
generating expertise (e.g., the role of instance-based learning in
naturalistic decision-making), but also to examine both where
heuristics come from and how they are applied; and how they
potentially lead to biased behavior. The implicit versus explicit
argument ignores the question of where heuristics may come from
– such as the structure of the task environment – something which
is essential for the implicit learning of expertise. We  argue that a
tripartite description is sufﬁcient to explain the source of both suc-
cesses and failures in decision-making. These three levels include
a description of the mechanisms and limitations of the architec-
ture, the information structure in the task environment, and the
use of heuristics and strategies to adapt performance to the dual
constraints of cognition and environment.
We are not the ﬁrst to argue for three levels of description.
For instance, in the fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Selten,
2002; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003) framework,
heuristics were determined from the interplay of basic cognitive
capacities and the environment. Fast-and-frugal heuristics exploit
commonalities in the structure of the task environment to not only
support capacity limitations in the mind (e.g., short-term mem-
ory), but show how these limitation may  be adaptive given the
environment.
Similarly, the general argument of ecological rationality is that
rationality is context- and situation-dependent, thus something
considering irrational in one context may  be fully rational in
another. For instance, if the goal is to make accurate inferences,
then using the recognition heuristic is ecological rational in envi-
ronments where one’s recognition of an object (e.g., a city name)
correlates with the criterion to be inferred (e.g., city size). Ecologi-
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ocus on the world (the study of regularities and constraints in the
nvironment), and a focus on putting mind and world together (the
tudy of ecological rationality). What we have done is adopt a sim-
lar framework for the study of cognitive architectures, and focus
n explaining behavior in terms of the more transparent cognitive
onstraints of the architecture (in that you can point to the under-
ying mechanism in the architecture), task environment, and model
tructure. However, we argue that by situating our tripartite level
f description within a cognitive architecture, we may  make more
ausal claims as to the underlying structure of the heuristics and
ow they may  result in biased behavior based on the complexity of
he environment.
The ﬁrst level of description entails an understanding of the
onstraints imposed by the mechanisms and limitations of the cog-
itive architecture. In ACT-R, these include an understanding of the
mpact of recency and frequency of the likelihood of an instance
eing retrieved, which also inﬂuences the ability of the model to
eneralize to new situations when using blended retrievals to gen-
rate a derived output rather than a speciﬁc instance. Other sources
f constraint include the serial nature of the production system,
nly a single chunk being in a buffer at a time, and matching human
ime-course of responses. A common source of biased behavior
n instance-based learning decision-making models is the use of
lended retrievals, which have a tendency to retrieve values that
re pulled toward the mean of all values in memory. This common
echanism can lead to both anchoring and conﬁrmation biases
ased on how far the anchored value varies from the mean across
ll instances in memory (Lebiere et al., 2013). It is important to note
hat this wholly implicit process is not consciously available to the
odel.
The second level of description entails an understanding of
he constraints imposed by the task environment. This kind of
escription has been somewhat neglected in discussions of the
alidity of cognitive models; however, it is a critical feature in
nderstanding both the consistency of learning and the nature of
iases. An understanding of the statistical and quantiﬁable regu-
arities within the task environment drives the overall ability and
ate of learning, and the nature of environmental feedback pro-
ides further evidence. Using an example from Simon (1990); if
ou want to study the movement of an ant across the beach you
eed look no further than the hills and valleys in the sand to deter-
ine its path. To further push this issue, Simon (1990) argued that
[h]uman rational behavior ... is shaped by a scissors whose two
lades are the structure of the task environments and the com-
utational capabilities of the actor” (Simon, 1990, p. 7). Some of
he mechanisms of ACT-R were created following a rational anal-
sis (Anderson, 1990), which assumes that cognitive processes
re optimally adapted to the environment. Therefore, if we  are
ble to capture the essential structure of the environment in ACT-
, we should be able to predict what kind of heuristics may  be
vailable or used in a given situation. This level of description is
lso the level of the unit task (Card et al., 1983), and is generally
aptured in ACT-R by speciﬁc goal types that drive a set of pro-
uctions that represent the cognitive skills required for solving the
ask.
The third level of description entails an understanding of how
he joint constraints of architecture and task environment inﬂu-
nce the kinds of heuristics and strategies available to the model.
n ACT-R terms, this is the explanation of the selection and sequence
f productions ﬁring. This level is most important to describe as it
ntails most of the choices of the modeler in designing the model.
n strategy selection, even simple heuristic structures can greatly
nﬂuence the output of the model, which in turn could overly
onstrain decision-making while also making complex problems
ractable. In other words, the detection of affordances (Gibson,
977) provided by the task environment inﬂuence the kinds of Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 180–190
information that the model can accumulate and the actions that
the model may  perform.
One use of affordances in ACT-R is to think of them in terms of
cognitive niches (Marewski & Link, 2014; Marewski & Schooler,
2011). As previously discussed, cognitive niches are affordances
that constrain the set of available strategies that the model may
choose from based on the interplay between prior experiences and
the task environment. The selection of which heuristics to apply to a
given context may  also be learned by the model through production
utilities via reinforcement learning, with early learning occurring
as a trial-and-error process until sufﬁcient reinforcement occurs
through experience or is inferred by explicit task instruction. This
is analogous to how, in instance-based learning, the model transi-
tions from reasoning via heuristics to reasoning via instances with
enough experience. The mechanism for how the model moves from
heuristic- to instance-based reasoning can be seen as a kind of
metacognitive awareness (which itself does not totally escape the
strategy selection argument).
Now that we are armed with a theory (instance-based learning)
and a means of describing model output (the tripartite description),
we can delve into an example.
5. Intuitive decisions in sensemaking
Rather than provide an overview of many examples, we would
like to focus on an in-depth analysis of a single ACT-R model of
sensemaking that uses instance-based learning to perform six com-
plex geospatial intelligence tasks and provides both an explanation
of the origin of biases and a close ﬁt to human data (see Lebiere et al.,
2013 for a more complete description of the tasks and for quanti-
tative model ﬁts). Sensemaking is a concept that has been used to
deﬁne a class of activities and tasks in which there is an active seek-
ing and processing of information to achieve understanding about
some state of affairs in the world, which has also been applied in
organizational decision-making (Weick, 1995).
Our sensemaking model is composed of three related compo-
nents. The ﬁrst (Tasks 1–3) learns statistical patterns of events and
then generates probability distributions of category membership
based on the spatial location and frequency of these events (e.g.
how likely does a given event belong to each of the categories).
The second (Tasks 4–6) applies probabilistic decision rules in order
to generate and revise probability distributions of category mem-
bership (e.g., if a given feature is present at an event, then that
event is twice as likely to belong to category A). The third (Tasks
1–6) involves making decisions about the allocation of resources
based on the judged probabilities of the causes of perceived events,
and is effectively a metacognitive measure of conﬁdence in one’s
judgment.
The remainder of this section describes the methods and results
of the six tasks from Lebiere et al. (2013). We  use the term par-
ticipants to reﬂect both human subjects and the ACT-R model
performing the task.
For Tasks 1–3, the ﬂow of an average trial proceeded accord-
ing to the following general outline (see Fig. 4 for an example of
the task interface). First, participants perceived a series of events
labeled according to which category the event belonged. After per-
ceiving the series of events, participants were asked to generate a
center of activity (e.g., prototype) for each category’s events, reﬂect
on how strongly they believed the probe belonged to each category,
and generate a probability estimate for each category (summed to
100% across all groups). Scoring was  determined by comparing par-
ticipants’ distributions to an optimal Bayesian solution. Using these
scores it was  possible to determine certain biases. For instance,
participants’ probability estimates that exhibited lower entropy
than a fully rational Bayes model would be considered to exhibit a
R. Thomson et al. / Journal of Applied Research in
Fig. 4. A sample of the task interface. To the left is a legend explaining all the sym-




































a recency bias that is incompatible with the task environmentvent categories. The pane across the top provides step-by-step instructions for
articipants.
onﬁrmation bias, while probability estimates having higher
ntropy than an optimal Bayes model would be considered to
xhibit an anchoring bias. The model was compared trial-by-trial
gainst humans to determine whether both expressed the biases
r otherwise.
Participants were then asked to allocate resources to each cat-
gory with the goal of maximizing their resource allocation score,
hich was the amount of resources allocated to the correct cate-
ory. For Tasks 1–3, the resource allocation response was  a forced
hoice decision to allocate 100% of their resources to a single cat-
gory, and participants received feedback whether or not their
ategorization was correct.
For Tasks 4–6, the ﬂow of an average trial was  structurally dif-
erent as intelligence ‘features’, governed by probabilistic decision
ules, were presented in sequential layers on the display. These
asks required reasoning based on rules concerning the relation of
bserved evidence to the likelihood of an unknown event belong-
ng to each of four different categories. Participants updated their
eliefs (i.e., likelihoods) after each layer of information (i.e., fea-
ure) was presented. For instance, in Task 4, after determining
he center of activity for each category (similar in mechanism
o Tasks 1–3) and reporting an initial probability estimate, the
OCINT (SOCial INTelligence) layer would be presented by display-
ng color-coded regions on the display representing each category’s
oundary, where the likelihood of the event belonging to a given
ategory is twice as likely if it was within that category’s bound-
ry. After reviewing the information presented by the SOCINT layer,
articipants were required to update their likelihoods based on this
nformation and the corresponding probabilistic decision rule.
When all the layers have been presented (two layers in Task
, ﬁve layers in Task 5, and four layers in Task 6), participants
ere required to generate a resource allocation. In these Tasks, the
esource allocation response was produced using the same inter-
ace as probability estimates. For instance, assuming that resources
ere allocated such that {A = 40%, B = 30%, C = 20%, D = 10%}, if the
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then the participant would receive a score of 40 out of 100, whereas
if the probe instead belonged to category B, they would score 30
points.
Two separate exams were collected from two separate popu-
lations. The model performed the ﬁrst exam and was  compared
against 45 participants who  were employees of the MITRE Corpo-
ration. All participants completed informed consent and debrieﬁng
questionnaires that satisﬁed IRB requirements. Without going into
extensive detail over the results, the ACT-R model signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted many of the trial-by-trial variations in human performance,
and not only the presence or absence of a bias, but also the quantity
of the bias metric, reﬂected in an overall r2 = .645 for negentropy
scores across all tasks.
The results of the model were then compared to the results of a
novel sample gathered from 103 students at Penn State University.
This new data set was  not available before the model was run, and
no parameters or knowledge structures were changed to ﬁt this
data set. Unlike the original 45-participant dataset, the Penn State
sample used only people who  had taken course credit toward a
graduate Geospatial Intelligence Certiﬁcate. The model correctly
predicted both the presence and degree of biases on every trial
in Tasks 1–3, and followed similar trial-by-trial trends for biases in
Tasks 4–5. The quantitative ﬁts of the model were also similar, with
an overall r2 = .591 for negentropy scores across all tasks.
6. We  will now provide an overview of the model function
6.1. Biases in group center generation
In the ﬁrst task component, the ﬂow of an average trial began
with participants perceiving a series of events labeled according to
which category the event belonged, each corresponding to a group
icon on the central map, after which a probe was displayed. Par-
ticipants were then required to generate a center of activity for
each category’s events, and generate a probability estimate for each
category (summed to 100%).
When group centers were generated directly from a retrieval
of events represented in memory, the blended retrieval process
in ACT-R reﬂected a disproportionate inﬂuence of the most recent
events given their higher base-level activation. A strategy to combat
this recency bias consisted of generating a ﬁnal response by per-
forming a blended retrieval over all the group centers (both current
and past centers generated for previous trials) stored in memory,
thereby giving more weight to earlier events by compounding the
inﬂuence of earlier centers over the subsequent blended retrievals.
This second-order blended retrieval is done for each category across
their prior existing centers, which we  refer to as the generation of
a centroid-of-centroids. This effectively implements an anchoring-
and-adjustment process where each new estimate is a combination
of the previous ones together with the new evidence.
A fundamental difference with traditional implementation of
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics is that this process is entirely
constrained by the architectural mechanisms (especially blending)
and does not involve any additional degrees of freedom. More-
over, because there are an equal number of centroid-of-centroids
chunks (one per category created after each trial), there is no
effect of base-rate on the model’s later probability judgments, even
though the base-rate for each category is implicitly available in the
model based on the number of recallable events. This illustrates
the metacognitive nature of heuristics in our tripartite organiza-
tion: given that the nature of cognitive mechanisms gives rise to(assuming a stable distribution), the centroid-of-centroids heuris-
tic is used to give more weight to older instances and circumvent





























































the trial) if the model receives enough negative feedback (i.e., poor88 R. Thomson et al. / Journal of Applied Resea
echanisms arose because it indeed reﬂected the nature of many
nvironments (Anderson & Schooler, 1991), making it well adapted
o those settings. There is no such thing as suboptimal bias: just
 mismatch between assumptions and environment that occa-
ionally needs to be supplemented with the proper heuristic
djustment.
.2. Biases in probability adjustment
In this task component, event features – such as the location
r context of events – were presented in sequential layers on the
isplay. Initial distributions for each category were provided to par-
icipants, after which participants updated their beliefs after each
eature was revealed. Beliefs were updated based on a set of pro-
ided probabilistic decision rules: e.g., if the MOVINT (movement
ntelligence) feature shows dense trafﬁc, then groups A and C are
our times as likely as groups B and D. When all the layers were
resented, participants were required to allocate resources to each
ategory.
To leverage an instance-based learning approach for probability
djustment, the ACT-R model’s memory was seeded with a range
f instances consisting of triplets: an initial probability, an adjust-
ent factor, and the resulting probability. The factor is set by the
xplicit rules of the task. When the model is asked to estimate the
esulting probability for a given prior and multiplying factor, it sim-
ly performs a blended retrieval specifying prior and factor, and
hen outputs the posterior probability that represents the blended
onsensus of the seeded chunks.
When provided with linear similarities between probabilities
and factors), the primary effect is an underestimation of the
djusted probability for much of the initial probability range (i.e.,
n anchoring bias), with an overestimation on the lower end of
he range (i.e., conﬁrmation bias). While the magnitude of the
iases can be modulated somewhat by architectural parameters,
he effects themselves are a priori predictions of the architecture,
n particular its theoretical constraints on memory retrieval.
A simpler and more implicit model of probability adjustment can
e produced by representing the various hypotheses as chunks in
emory and using their activation as an estimate of their strength
f support. When evidence is received, it is matched against pat-
erns linking it to various hypotheses and the best matching one is
etrieved, leading to a boost in activation. If contradictory evidence
tarts accumulating, two biases will emerge. First, new evidence
ill sometimes be misinterpreted because the current dominant
ypothesis is most active and can overcome some degree of mis-
atch. Second, even if the evidence is correctly interpreted and the
orrect hypothesis reinforced, for the new hypothesis to attain pri-
acy it will take some time to sufﬁciently build activation and for
he activation of the previously dominant hypothesis to sufﬁciently
ecay over time. This process has been given a number of names,
rom anchoring bias to persistence of discredited evidence.
A number of structured analytic techniques have been proposed
o remedy these biases emerging from the dynamics of our cog-
itive system (Heuer & Pherson, 2010). The most prominent one
ight be Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, which proposes a pro-
ess by which all competing hypotheses are evaluated against each
iece of evidence and the sum of their support only computed and
ompared at the end. This is done to prevent the early emergence
f a favored hypothesis and the resulting biases. An analog to the
nalysis of Competing Hypotheses has been implemented in our
odel and can be shown to directly affect the activation dynam-
cs described above. Each hypothesis chunk receives a rehearsal at
ach step, equalizing the inﬂuence of base-rate from their activa-
ion and preventing a winner-take-all dynamic. The result is that
heir activation over time will simply reﬂect the degree of sup-
ort that they have received. In this example, structured analytic Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 180–190
techniques can also be seen as metacognitive heuristics that lever-
age the beneﬁcial aspects of cognitive mechanisms while defeating
or at least limiting their potential biases and thus provide external
aids to our intuitive decision-making.
6.3. Biases in resource allocation
Resource allocation makes use of the same instance-based
learning paradigm as probability adjustment. This uniﬁed mech-
anism has no explicit strategies, but instead learns to allocate
resources according to the outcomes of past decisions. The model
generates a resource allocation distribution by focusing on the lead-
ing category and determining how many resources to allocate to
that category. The remaining resources are divided amongst the
remaining three categories in proportion to their assigned proba-
bilities. Representation of a trial instance consists of three parts: a
decision context (i.e., the probability of the leading category), the
decision itself (i.e., the resource allocation to the leading category),
and the outcome of the decision (i.e., the payoff).
The model’s control logic takes a hybrid approach between
choice (Lebiere & Anderson, 2011) and decision models (Wallach
& Lebiere, 2003a), involving two steps of access to experiences in
declarative memory rather than a single one. When determining
how many resources to apply to the lead category, the model ini-
tially has only the probability assigned to that category. The ﬁrst
step is done by performing a blended retrieval on chunks repre-
senting past resource allocation decisions using the probability as
a cue. The outcome value of the retrieved chunk is the expected
outcome for the trial. The second step is to generate the decision
that most likely leads to that outcome given the context. Note that
this process is not guaranteed to generate optimal decisions, and
indeed people do not. Rather, it represents a parsimonious way to
leverage our memory of past decisions in this paradigm that still
provides functional behavior. A signiﬁcant theoretical achievement
of our approach is that it uniﬁes control models and choice models
in a single decision-making paradigm.
After feedback is received, the model learns a resource alloca-
tion decision chunk that associates the leading category probability,
the quantity of resources assigned to the leading category, and the
actual outcome of the trial (i.e., the resource allocation score for
that trial). Additionally, up to two  counterfactual chunks are com-
mitted to declarative memory. The counterfactuals represent what
would have happened if a winner-take-all resource assignment had
been applied, and what would have happened if a pure probability-
matched resource assignment (i.e., using the same values as the
ﬁnal probabilities) had been applied. The actual nature of the coun-
terfactual assignments is not important; what is essential is to give
the model a broad enough set of experience representing not only
the choices made but also those that could have been made. The
use of a counterfactual strategy to generate a diversity of outcomes,
experienced or imagined, can be seen as a very general and effective
metacognitive heuristic.
The advantage of this approach is that the model is not forced
to choose between a discrete set of strategies such as winner-take-
all or probability matching; rather, various strategies can emerge
from instance-based learning. By priming the model with the
winner-take-all and probability matching strategies (essentially
the boundary conditions), it is possible for the model to learn any
strategy in between them, such as a tendency to more heavily weigh
the leading candidate, or even suboptimal strategies such as choos-
ing 25% for each of the four categories (assuring a score of 25 onscores) so as to encourage risk aversion. Instance-based learning
can thus be seen in this instance as a highly ﬂexible metacog-
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. Discussion
So far, we have argued that cognitive architectures aid in the
tudy of intuitive decision-making by providing a falsiﬁable the-
ry for the study of mechanisms, processes, and representations
nvolved in decision-making. By using a cognitive architecture, one
s adopting constraints involved in managing the ﬂow of knowledge
nd processes involved in these knowledge operations. Architec-
ures expand our ability to go beyond ‘just-so’ explanations to
escribe the underlying processes and knowledge leading up to
ecisions. They also provide more ﬂexibility beyond the constraints
f expertise-based systems when operating outside of very con-
trained and/or very stable environments. In many cases, models
ased in a cognitive architecture can perform tasks and provide
estable predictions that are too complex to analyze with tradi-
ional experimental methods due to the combinatorics of possible
ecisions.
The next step in the development of cognitive architectures
hould be mechanisms to support the generalizability of models
nd reduce degrees of freedom. Some preliminary thrusts include:
he integration of neurally plausible associative learning to drive
mplicit statistical learning of regularities within the environment
Thomson & Lebiere, 2013), the development of expectation-driven
ognition to cue episodic memory formation (Kurup et al., 2012),
nd more generally the development of strategy selection (or
etacognitive awareness) within the architecture to guide the
election of features used in the representation and retrieval of
nstances (Lebiere et al., 2009; Marewski & Link, 2014; Marewski
 Schooler, 2011; Reitter, Juvina, Stocco, & Lebiere, 2010; Reitter,
010).
Ideally, the strategies and heuristics implemented in the archi-
ecture should be selected (if not created) by the model itself rather
han provided by the modeler. The model (driven by the archi-
ecture) should be responsible for the selection and evolution of
trategies. To get started, however, several general procedures are
eeded to bootstrap learning until sufﬁcient knowledge is learned,
t which point processes implicated in generating expertise should
ead to interesting emergent behaviors (and novel predictions)
ithin the model. The question of which minimal set of procedures
est captures human performance is an empirical one, and one that
eeds to be a center of focus. The adoption of general frameworks
uch as instance-based learning and the adoption of a common set
f heuristics across tasks appear to be the next step in the right
irection.
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